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NO JUDICIAL DYSLEXIA: THE CUSTODIAL PARENT
PRESUMPTION DISTINGUISHES THE PATERNAL FROM
THE PARENTAL RIGHT TO NAME A CHILD

I. INTRODUCTION
When confronted with parents disagreeing about the name' of
their child, modern courts may resolve the conflict by presuming
that the custodial parent acts in the child's best interest. An
objecting noncustodial parent must overcome this presumption by
proving that the custodial parent's decision threatens the child's
welfare according to the standards of the states. 2 This presumptive
scheme, herein referred to as the ''custodial parent presumption,' ' 3
merits consideration in a society where divorce frequently occurs, 4
providing the ground for the name battle. When divorced parents
remarry 5 they extend the area for dispute. Traditionally, courts
1. The word name in this Note refers to a person's surname, unless otherwise indicated.
Parental disputes also relate to a child's given and middle name. See, e.g., Webber v. Parker, 167 So.
2d 519 (La. Ct. App.) (mother named child Michael Quinn Webber, father's preference of Absalom
Theodore Webber was denied), writ refused, 246 La. 883, 168 So. 2d 268 (1964); In re M.L.P., 621
S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (mother named child after her father, Marcus Lee, and Pinkston
after husband; father's preference of Shawn Christian or' 'something else'' was denied).
2. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 610 (Smith-Hurd 1977) (court does not have jurisdiction to
modify custody for two years unless the child may be severely endangered); UNIF. MARRIAGE &
DIVORCE AcT§ 409(a) (1970) (two-year period).
3. The term "custodial parent presumption," though not expressly used by any court,
combines the denotations of the custody and parent to signify the presumptive scheme articulated by
concurring judge Mosk in In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 648-51,620 P.2d 579, 584-85, 169 Cal.
Rptr. 918, 923-25 (1980)(Mosk, J., concurring). See infra note 14.
4. In 1980 more than nine million divorces occurred. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 37 (1981).
5. Within the first through fifth year after divorce, without regard to age, 243 of 1,000 divorced
men and 192 of 1,000 divorced women remarry. Uviller, Father's Rights and Feminism: The Maternal
Presumption Revisited, 1 HARV. WoMEN's L.J.l07, 122 n.50(1978).
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have analyzed ''paternal'' rights in naming rather than ''parental''
rights. 6 These courts have held that the paternal surname should
not be changed unless the father has been given notice, 7 has
committed a heinous act, 8 has failed to support his child, 9 has
abandoned his child, 10 or has given the child up for adoption. 11
Although most courts state that only the child's best interest should
be considered, the " 'best interest of the child' test has customarily
favored the father-child relationship." 12
This Note will discuss whether courts should continue to
emphasize the paternal naming right rather than recognize a
parental naming right that arises from a court's determination of
custody. Examination of the custodial parent presumption entails a
three-part analysis - the definition of the custodial parent presumption, the legal significance of a name, 13 and the application
of the custodial parent presumption to hypothetical situations to
reveal the advantages and disadvantages of the model. With this
6. See gen"al/y Annat., 92 A. L. R. 3o 1091 (1979).
7. See, e.g., In reTubbs, 620 P.2d 384 (Okla. 1980) (personal notice due in post divorce ancillary
proceeding to change a child's name).
8. See, e.g., In re Christjohn, 286 Pa. Super. 112, 428 A.2d 598 (Super. Ct. 1981) (petition
granted to change child's surname from father's to deceased stepfather's because father's killing of
stepfather subjected child to severe emotional distress).
9. See, e.g., Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 317 N .W.2d 381 (1982) (granted hyphenated name,
with father's name first, because father had not been guilty of misconduct, nor had he failed to
support the child).
10. In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981) (denied addition uf maternal name to paternal
surname because father wrote letters, called, sent presents, and had custody for one month), cert.
denied, 102 S. Ct. 1787 (1982); Robinson v. Hansel, 302 Minn. 138, 223 N.W.2d 138 (1974) (denied
addition of stepfather's name to paternal surname because a change could sever the weak parental
bond).
11. In re McCoy, 31 Ohio Misc. 195, 287 N.E.2d 833 (C.P. 1972) (change of name proceeding
considered simultaneously with adoption proceeding).
12. Note, The Controversy ov" Children's Surnames: Family Autonomy, Equal Protection and the Child's
&st Interest, 1979 UTAH L. REv. 303,323. In In reSchiffman]udge Mask used this passage to support
the preference for the custodial parent presumption. In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d at 650, 620 P.2d at
585, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 924 (Mask, J ., concurring).
13. This Note describes the history of name changes arising out of litigation concerning a
woman's right to her own name rather than the determination of custody. Dr. Ralph Slovenko,
professor of law and psychiatry, offers the same historical perspective: "Today a recurring
controversy over which name one may bear (or give to another) has assumed special prominence in
legal circles largely as a result of the women!-s liberation movement but also as a result of feelings
encouraging self-expression.'' Slovenko, On Naming, 2 AM. J. PsYCHOTHERAPY 208, 218 (1980).
Forbush v. Wallau, decided in 1971, particularly roused women because the United States
Supreme Court rejected the constitutional attack on an unwritten Alabama regulation requiring a
married woman to register for a driver's license using her husband's name. Forbush v. Wallace, 341
F. Supp. 21 7, 223 (M.D. Ala. 1971 ), a.fl'd without opinion, 405 U.S. 970 (1972). Eleven years later the
Supreme Court of Alabama granted women the right to have their driver's licenses in their own
names. The court distinguished Forbush on the ground that the petitioner had inaccurately conceded
that the common law required her to assume her husband's name upon marriage. State v. Taylor,
415 So. 2d 1043, 1047 (Ala. 1982). See infra note 134 and accompanying text. See generally Daum, The
Right of Married Women to Assert Their Own Surnames, 8 U. MicH. J.L. REF. 63 (1974); Karst, A
Discrimination So Trivial: A Note on the Law and the Symbolism rif Women's Depenrkncy, 35 OHIO ST. L.J.
546 (1974); MacDougall, Women's, Men's, Children's Names: An Outline and Bibliography, 7 FAM. L.
REP. 4013 (1981); Comment, Surname Alternatives in Pennsylvania, 82 DicK. L. REv. 101 (1977);
Comment, Women's Name Rights, 59 MARQ. L. REv. 876 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Comment,
Women's Name Rights]; Comment, Mam.td Women and the Name Game, 11 U. RICH. L. REv. 121 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as Comment, Name Game].
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analytic foundation, courts can thus assess the merits of the
custodial parent presumption as an alternative to the traditional
patronymic naming system. 14

II. DEFINITION OF THE CUSTODIAL PARENT PRESUMPTION
The primary focus of the custodial parent presumption is
custody . 15 An implicit proposition of the custodial parent concept is
that a name is an important factor in the child's development. 16
Traditionally, courts have regarded the decision to change a child's
name as a paternal rather than a parental right arising from the
award of custody. 17 These courts discerned the right to name a
14. The phrase "patronymic naming system" signifies the perpetuation of the paternal
preference in naming children. The word patronymic means "a name derived from that of the father
or a paternal ancestor usually by the addition of a prefix or suffix (as in A-!acDonald, son of Donald, or
/vanovich, son of Ivan)." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1656 (4th ed. 1976).
15. In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d at 648, 620 P.2d at 584, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 923 (Mosk, J .,
concurring). A narrow definition of a custodial parent refers to the natural parent who has the legal
right to custody of the child. See, e.g., L.A.M. v. State, 547 P.2d 827 (Alaska 1976). The L.A.M.
court found that "a review of literature, including case law, treatise, and law review, indicates
that ... [one parental right] protected ... by the Constitution ... [is] [t]he right to have a child bear
the parent's name." /d. at 832 n.13. This right remains even after custody is placed in another. The
custodial parent's power, however, is not absolute. /d.
A broader definition is also possible. A stepfather may arguably be a custodial parent because he
may incur the detriment ofsueeort if the marriage dissolves. See, e.g., Kelley v. Iowa Dep't of Social
Servs., 197 N.W.2d 192 (Iowa 1972). The Kelley court reasoned that "a step-parent who is living
with his step-children (in loco parentis) . . . is obligated to support them." /d. at 199. For a
discussion that implicitly recognizes the stepfather's role in rearing - affording rights as well as
duties, see Blustein, Child Rearing and Family Interests, in HAVING CHILDREN: PHILOSOPHICAL AND
LEGAL REFLECTIONS ON PARENTHOOD 115-22 ( 1979). The author states:
[T]he source of child-rearing duties lies not in procreation but in social practices and
in the legitimate interests of various parties in these practices.
Legitimate social interests in child-rearing practices include the following: first,
an interest in the maintenance of a certain level of procreation, and in the physical
care, education, and socialization of the child; second, an interest in seeing that the
institutions responsible for carrying out these tasks mesh with other social institutions.
[The children's duties are] facilitation [of] and non-interference [with] . . . the
[parent's] duties to care for, educate, and socialize their children.
/d. at 117, 119-20. See also Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (to be named custodial parent
upon the mother's death, stepfather must show that he had actually nurtured the children).
For a discussion of other definitions of custody, see M. MoRGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, joiNT
CusTODY 27-43 (1981).
16. Judge Mosk in In re Schiffman, does not attempt to rank the importance of a name but
recognizes that a name contributes to the child's well-being and adjustment in s0ciety. 28 Cal. 3d at
648, 620 P.2d at 583, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 923. For discussion of the importance of the parental right to
name a child, see O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494 (E.D.N.C. 1981) (name statute that limits
parental choice unconstitutionally impinges upon decisions affecting family life, procreation, and
child-rearing); Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714, 719 (D. Hawaii 1979) (parents have a common law
right to give their child any name they wish, and the fourteenth amendment protects this right from
arbitrary state action); Rice v. Department of Health and Rehab. Servs., 386 So. 2d 844 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1980) (Booth, J., dissenting) (personal choice is of "great importance"); Secretary of
Commonwealth v. City Clerk, 373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E.2d 717, 724 (1977) (constitutional right to
family autonomy protects parents' right to select even a foolish name); D'Ambrosio v. Rizzo, 81
Mass. App. Ct. 1539, 425 N.E.2d 369 (App. Ct. 1981) (naming of a child is a right and a privilege
belonging to the child's parents). See also infra note 190.
17. See, e.g., Carroll v. Johnson, 263 Ark. 280, 565 S. W .2d 10 (1978); In re Spatz, 199 Neb. 332,
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child as a right different from that of the custodial parent to
determine the child's environment, education, and religion. 18
Courts therefore have implied that the naming right is so important
that it mandates judicial intervention. 19
A custodial parent, however, is presumed to be a fit parent
and to act in the child's best interests. 20 This presumption exists
because at the original determination of custody a court evaluates
numerous factors in deciding who is to receive the rights and
responsibilities of a custodial parent. 21 Even if both parents are fit,
a court nonetheless must choose the parent who will make
significant decisions about a child's welfare. 22 The decision about a
child's name should logically be a responsibility incidental to
custody. 23 An understanding of the custodial parent presumption
therefore entails an overview of the original custody determination.
This determination is based on the child's best interest.U There are
three salient aspects of the child's best interest test-the purpose of
the test, the factors courts consider, and the relationship of the
custodial parent presumption to the tender years doctrine.
A.

PuRPOSE

oF

THE CHILD's BEsT INTEREST TEsT

In attempting to resolve name disputes, courts frequently
borrow the words "child's best interests" from custody case law
and then ascribe a different connotation to these words. 25 Courts
258 N.W.2d 814 (1977). But see, e.g., Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58,540 P.2d 1277 (Ct. App. 1975)
(elimination of the inequality between the sexes gives the mother an interest equal to that of the
father; to recognize only the interest of the father is an impermissible classification based on sex); In
re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 620 P.2d 579, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980) (Supreme Court of California
abolished the presumption that the father has a primary right to have his child bear his surname); In
re Saxton, 309 N. W .2d 298 (Minn. 1981) (neither parent has a superior right to determine the initial
surname that the child shall bear).
18. See, e.g., Jacobs v. Jacobs, 309 N .W. 2d 303 (Minn. 1981 )(at birth naming right); Bennett v.
Northcutt, 544 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. Ct. App. 1976) (name change denied even though the child
evinced a strong desire for his stepfather's name by using it and even though experts thought use of
the father's surname might be detrimental).
19. See, e.g., Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 317 N.W.2d 381 (1982) (no presumption exists in
favor of custodial parent); Ex parte Stull, _ _ S.C. _ _ , 280 S.E.2d 209 (1981) (action must be
instituted by guardian ad litem, not custodial parent).
20. See, e.g., In reSchiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 620 P.2d 579, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980)(Mosk,J.,
concurring) (the custodial parent presumption is analogous to the presumption arising from
custody).
21. Courts use various factors to determine the child's best interest. See infra notes 43-52 and
accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of the relationship between the custodial parent's naming right and joint
custody, see infra notes 220, 224 and accompanying text.
23. Solomon v. Solomon, 5 Ill. App. 2d 297, _ _ , 125 N.E.2d 675, 678 (App. Ct. 1955). The
Solomon court reasoned that a change of name of a minor child of divorced parents is a matter
incidental to the custody of the child. /d. at _ _ , 125 N.E.2d at 678. The Solomon decision remained
unchallenged in Illinois for 25 years, until/n re Larson. Brief for Appellant at 5, In re Larson, No. 80849(Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 27, 1980).
24. Nearly every custody case contains language referring to the child's best interest. H. CLARK,
DoMESTIC RELATIONS 5 72 n. 2 ( 1968).
25. See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
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generally interpret the child's best interest m terms of the
patronymic naming system. 26
The primary reason for the court's adherence to the
traditional male preference arises from a common factual pattern.
The mother, who has custody, seeks to have the child bear the
stepfather's surname, which she had adopted as her ownY With
the child in a new environment, courts state that retention of the
paternal surname will strengthen the "tenuous paternal bond. " 28
This interpretation thus suggests a dispute between two males, the
natural father and the stepfather, rather than between the
noncustodial parent's lack of authority and the custodial parent's
right to make significant decisions. 29
Courts preserve the paternal naming right by creating the
presumption that a name can be changed only when the substantial
welfare of the child requires it; 30 when the custodial mother
presents substantial evidence, justifying the change; 31 or when
there is "clear, cogent, and convincing evidence that such change
will significantly advance the interests of the child.' ' 32 Only when
the father abandons 33 the child or commits a criminal act that
denigrates the family name would the father's consent be
unnecessary. 34 The presumption preserving the male naming right
therefore seems to place an almost impossible burden upon a
26. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
27. Attorney Priscilla Ruth MacDougall ranks the frequency of fact patterns in the following
manner: '' [A J change to the stepfather's name which the mother has adopted as her own, rarely as a
change to the mother's name, and then in situations where she has not remarried." Appellant's
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States at 28 n.ll, In re Saxton, 309
N.W.2d 298 (Minn. !981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1737 (1982). These general patterns arise either
from the mother's filing of a petition in accordance with a statute with the father then opposing, or
from the child's pursuit of a common law name change, with the noncustodial parent seeking an
injunction to compel retention of the original surname. Mark v. Kahn, 333 Mass. 517, _ _ , 131
N.E.2d 758, 761 (1956).
.
28. See, e.g., Carroll v. Johnson, 265 Ark. 242, 565 S.W.2d 10 (1978) (change could erode
bond); Mark v. Kahn, 333 Mass. 517, 131 N.E.2d 758 (1956) (if child's name is changed, the
parental bond may be weakened Or destroyed).
29. A court's discussion of the paternal bond usually means that it will deny the name change
because either the divorce has weakened the paternal bond or because the presence of a child support
payment has strengthened the bond. ~ee, e.g., Robinson v. Hansel, 302 Minn. 34,223 N.W.2d 138
(1974) (even though a divorce decree terminates a marriage, courts have traditionally tried to
maintain and encourage continuing parental relationships); In re Harris, 236 S.E.2d 426 (W. Va.
1977) ("[F]ather who exercises his parental rights has a protectable interest in his children bearing
his surname and this interest is one quid pro quo of his reciprocal obligation of support and
maintenance.").
30. In reSpatz, 199 Ntb. 332,333-34,258 N.W.2d 814,815 (1977).
31. Norton v. Norton, 268 Ark. 791, 793, 595 S. W .2d 709, 711 (Ct. App. 1980).
32. In re Harris, 236 S.E.2d 426, 429 (W. Va. 1977). See Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, 540
P.2d 1277 (Ct. App. 1975); Degerbergv. McCormick, 4 Del. Ch. 46, 187 A.2d 436 (Del. Ch. 1963);
Lazow v. Lazow, 147 So. 2d 12 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); West v. Wright, 263 Md. 297, 283 A.2d
40! (1971); In re Robinson, 74 Misc. 2d 63, 344 N.Y.S.2d 147 (Civ. Ct. 1972). The burden of proof
is even more demanding in adoption cases. See Ward v. Faw, 219 Va. 1120, _ _ , 253 S.E.2d 658,
661 (1979).
33. SeeFlowersv. Cain, 237 S.E.2d Ill (Ya. 1977); InreHarris, 236S.E.2d426(W. Va. 1977).
34. In reChristjohn, 286 Pa. Super. 112, 428 A.2d 597 (Super. Ct. 1981).
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mother who determines that a name change would benefit her
child. 35 Some courts, however, find that the stringent burden of
proof does not discriminate against women because both parents
have equal naming rights at a child's birth. 36 These courts fail to
consider that the origin of the naming preference for the father
came from the traditional status of the male as head of the
householdY Consequently, today few couples probably know of
their naming options.
The purpose of retaining the paternal surname is sometimes
linked to the amount of support, usually described in monetary
terms, 38 that the noncustodial father gives the child. 39 With this
orientation, courts view the change from the paternal surname as
one that separates the child from his or her father. 40 This
interpretation thus implies that change is detrimental to the child. 41
35. In reSaxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1737 (1982). The Saxton
decision demonstrates a court's reluctance to change a child's paternal name. Both the custodial
mother and the children, ages seven and nine, wanted to add the maternal surname to the paternal
surname. Psychologists also thought the hyphenated name would be beneficial to the children's
mental health. The noncustodial father, who lived in another state and fulfilled child support
obligations, protested the change, stating that his son was the "only male heir of the Dennis
surname, as I am an only child and my father is an only child." Appellant's Brief at 36a, In re
Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1737 (1982). The Supreme Court of
Minnesota upheld its standard that the custodial parent must offer clear and compelling evidence
that the substantial welfare of the child necessitates a change. 309 N. W .2d at 301. Although the court
stated that the children's preferences should have been considered, as they are in custody
proceedings, it rejected the constitutional attacks based on the assumption that the paternal name is
given preference. The court stated that due deference should be given to the fact that the child has
borne a given name for an extended period of time. !d. at 302.
The dissent favored the child's best interest standard for hyphenated names. !d. The dissent
reasoned that ''a change of the minor's surname would be appropriate where the change is beneficial
for the child, even though the given name is not detrimental to the child's well being." !d. at 303
(Wahl,J., dissenting).
36. See, e.g., Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 317 N.W.2d 381 (1982). In Cohee the Supreme
Court of Nebraska granted the objecting father's wish to add the paternal name and to place it first in
the hyphenated name on the birth certificate. The lower court had ordered the mother to amend the
birth certificate to the surname of the father (Cohee) or to the hyphenated name (Dugger-Cohee). !d.
at 382. The supreme court considered the naming issue de novo. It found that the father's name
should be first, offering no explanation for de novo review or for its decision to change the position of
the father's name. !d. at 384.
37. Carlsson, Surnames of Married Women and Legitimate Children, 17 N. Y .L.F. 552, 563 (1971 ).
38. In re Harris, 236 S.E. 2d 426 (W. Va. 1977). The West Virginia court stated: "The weight of
authority appears to be that absent extreme circumstances a father who exercises his parental rights
has a protectable interest in his children bearing his surname and this interest is one quid pro quo of his
reciprocal obligation of support and maintenance.'' /d. at 429.
39. In D.R.S. v. R.S.H. the dissent criticized the trial court's statement that if the mother
wanted the child to bear her name, child support payments should be reduced. D.R.S. v. R.S.H.,
_ _ Ind. App. _ _ , _ _ , 412 N.E.2d 1257, 1267 (Ct. App. 1980)(narrowed by J.L.A. v. T.B.S.,
_ _ Ind. App. _ _ , 430 N.E.2d 433 (Ct. App. 1982)). The dissent also disliked the following
statement made by the trial court: "If they want to play women's lib, then let them call it all by
themselves." /d. See West v. Wright, 263 Md. 297, 283 A.2d 401 ( 1971 ); In re Williams, 86 Misc. 2d
57,381 N.Y.S.2d994(Civ. Ct. 1976).
40. Even embarrassment to the child is insufficient to permit a change of the child's surname.
See Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, _ _ , 540 P.2d 1277, 1280 (Ct. App. 1975); Firman v. Firman,
_ _ Mont. _ _ , _ _ , 610 P.2d 178, 180 (1980); In reSpatz, 199 Neb. 332, _ _ , 258 N.W.2d 814,
815 (1977).
41. Two courts are so against change that they refused to allow even the addition of the
maternal name to the paternal name. Laks v. Laks, 25 Ariz. App. 58, _ _ , 540 P.2d 1277, 1280
(Ct. App. 1975); In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298, 302 (Minn. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1737
(1982).

NoTE

799

But such an implication does not arise when a custodial parent
exercises his or her right to change a child's physical environment,
educational development, or spiritual orientation. 42
B.

FACTORS CouRTS CoNSIDER IN NAMING DISPUTES

By discarding the presumption that the father has a primary
right to have his child bear his name, courts could attempt to
resolve the naming dispute in terms of the child's best interest
test. 43 Using this test, courts would consider the child in
relationship to both parents. 44 In 1980 the Supreme Court of
California in In re Schiffman 45 explicitly advocated the child's best
interest test in a naming dispute. 46
In Schiffman the custodial mother appealed an order that
changed the child's surname from the mother's birth name to the
father's surnameY The majority opinion explicitly declared that
the traditional paternal presumption be abolished. 48 The
concurrence by Judge Mask would recognize a presumption that
the custodial parent acts in the best interest of a child of tender
years when selecting a name. 49
The majority opinion in Schiffman expressly disapproved of its
earlier decisions that awarded the primary naming right to the
father. 50 The majority approved the use of certain factors to
determine the child's best interest in addition to the factor of
preserving the male naming right. 51 These factors include the
strength of the mother-child relationship, the identification of the
42. In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d at 649, 620 P. 2d at 585, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
43. Section 402 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act describes the best interests of a child:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the child.
The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(I) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his
siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best
interest;

(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not affect
the relationship of the child.
UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT§ 402 (1976).
44. A court's acceptance of the tender years doctrine, however, affects how the court evaluates
both parents. See infra notes 79-93 and accompanying text.
45. 28Cal. 3d640, 620P.2d579, 169Cal. Rptr. 918(1980).
46./n reSchiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640,648,620 P.2d 579,584, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918,923 (1980).
47./d. at641-42, 620 P.2d at580, 169 Cal. Rptr. at919.
48. !d. at647,620P.2dat583, 169Cal. Rptr. at922.
49. /d. at648, 620 P.2d at584-85, 169 Cal. Rptr. at923.
50. !d. at647, 620 P.2d at583, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
51. !d. at647, 620 P.2d at583, 169 Cal. Rptr. at922-23.
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child as part of a family unit, and the embarrassment or discomfort
that a child may experience when he bears a surname different
from that of the rest of his familyY An additional factor involves
the balancing of the symbolic role that a surname other than that of
the natural father may play in fostering familial bonds against the
importance of maintammg the biological father-child
relationship. 53 These factors thus lessen the primacy of the paternal
naming right because the court reduced the paternal right to a
factor, not the factor. The court must also consider the bonds
between the child and his or her mother, siblings, and stepfather if
they are a part ofthe family unit. 5 4
Concurring Judge Mask, however, views these factors as
having been considered previously at the custody determination 55
and finds the naming right to be an incident of custody. 56 A
custodial parent's decision about a name would be "just one in a
long list of ingredients contributing more or less to the child's wellbeing and adjustment in society.'' 57
When declaring that the custodial parent presumptively acts in
the child's best interest, Judge Mask, without any elaboration,
states that the general function of the custodial parent presumption
is to maintain the status quo. 58 Two contrasting definitions of status
quo are possible. One interpretation is that to change a child's
name alters the status quo by the very fact of change. This
interpretation suggests two different strengths of presumptions.
First, the custodial parent would presumptively have the right to
select a name and the noncustodial parent would have to overcome a
heavy burden because mere selection does not alter the status
quo. 59 Second, the custodial parent would presumptively have the
right to change a name but the noncustodial parent, generally the
father, 60 could easily rebut the presumption because a change of the
52. !d.
53. !d.
54. !d. at 648,620 P.2d at 584, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 923 (Mosk,J.; concurring).
55. !d.
56. !d. In Solomon v. Solomon the Illinois Appellate Court used the phrase "incidental to the
custody of the child" to describe its jurisdiction. Solomon v. Solomon, 5 Ill. App. 2d 297, 301,125
N.E.2d 675, 678 (Ct. App. 1955). Other state courts have considered significant the fact that one
parent has custody. SuWebberv. Parker, 167 So. 2d 519 (La. Ct. App.) (to select given name), writ
rifused, 264 La. 886, 168 So. 2d 269 (1964); State ex rei Spence-Chapin Servs. to Families & Children
v. Tedeno, 101 Misc. 2d485, 421 N.Y.S.2d297(Sup. Ct. 1979)(toselectsurname).
57. 28 Cal. 3d at 648, 620 P .2d at 584, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 923 (Mosk, J., concurring).
58. !d. at 650, 620 P.2d at 585, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 924.
59. The Supreme Court of Nebraska recently recognized that neither parent has a superior right
to determine the initial name. Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, _ _ , 317 N.W.2d 381, 384 (1982).
See Jacobs v. Jacobs, 309 N.W.2d 303, 305 (Minn. 1981). A statutory preference for the paternal
name was declared unconstitutional in both North Carolina and Hawaii. See O'Brien v. Tilson, 523
F. Supp. 494,497 (E. D. N.C. 1981);Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714,721 (D.C. Hawaii 1979).
60. In 1980 women headed single family households almost five times more often than did men.
U.S. 0EP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 43 ( 1981).
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child's previous ·name would alter the status quo. 61 Courts would
interpret these two presumptions in light of their general view of
presumptions. 62
The facts of Schiffman 63 suggest this presumptive weighing. 64 In
Schiffman the couple separated after six months of marriage and a
child was born five months later. The court noted that in this
situation the factor of how long a child had borne the father's name
was insignificant. 65 The logical inference is that this factor would be
significant in a name change proceeding. Therefore, the weight
ascribed to the father's naming right would be strengthened
because such a name change symbolizes an alteration of the status
quo. 66 The rationale for the dichotomy - naming at birth and
name changing- is unclear. 67
To avoid this illogical interpretation, a court must therefore
define maintenance of the status quo, not in terms of how long a
child had a particular surname, but rather in terms of maintaining
61. See, e.g., In reSaxton, 309 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1981) (court gave great weight to the child's
previous use of a surname, regardless of whose surname was originally given), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct.
1737 (1982); In re Tubbs, 620 P.2d 384 (Okla. 1980) (every divorced parent whose paternal or
maternal bond remains unsevered has a claim to his or her child continuing to bear the same legal
name as that by which it was known at the time the marriage was dissolved).
Whether couples know of the option to use a name other than the father's surname is unclear.
To make known the common law right to change one's name, a state attorney general has issued an
opinion stating that a husband has the common law right to adopt his wife's surname upon marriage.
Appellant's Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States at 23 n.8, In re
Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298(Minn. 1981), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1737 (1982).
62. The evidentiary effect of the custodial parent presumption would depend upon state law. See
generally Note, Presumptions According to Purpose, 45 ALB. L. REv. 1079 (1981 ).
The custodial parent presumption, based on the recognition of •he child's best interests, is a
presumption founded on the right of a parent to care for a child, not on procedure nor on probability.
!d. at 1090·91. Underlying the custodia! parent concept is the importance of maintaining the status
quo, which involves recognition of the custodial parent's right to make decisions about a child's
welfare and protection of the child's welfare by deterring quarreling parents from litigating. See supra
notes 58·61 and accompanying text.
These reasons have significance only if the court interprets the presumption as having the effect
of a Morgan presumption, not of a Thayer presumption. The Thayer theory of presumptions
employs the metaphor of a bursting bubble to explain the procedural effect. The presumption exists
when a party establishes the fact that allows the presumption of the presumed fact. The opposing
party, however, bursts the presumption when offering any evidence that contradicts the
presumption. Seej. WIGMORE, 9 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE§ 2493a, at 309·23 (1981). The Morgan
theory of presumptions preserves the presumption for the fact· finder even if the opposing party offers
cogent evidence attacking the validity of the presumption. !d. at 315-16.
A Morgan interpretation, therefore, would shift the burden of persuasion to the noncustodial
parent. A Thayer interpretation would cause the presumption to disappear when the noncustodial
parent offered any evidence. The important reasons underlying the custodial parent concept may
justify not considering the trend of a majority of states to adopt the Thayer theory. See Annat., 5
A.L.R. 3o 39-44 (1966 & Supp. 1980).
63. In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 620 P. 2d 579, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918 ( 1980).
64. !d. at 642, 620 P.2d at 580, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
65. !d. at 647,620 P.2d at 583, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 922.
66. !d.
67. A recent Note discerned that a distinction between naming at birth and name changing may
occur if a court purports to assert the importance of the child's best interest while in effect
recognizing the predominance of the paternal right:
[l]t seems ironic that while the child's surname is regarded as unimportant in
estab/isMng his relationship with his natural father, it would seem to be considered
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the custodial parent's right to make decisions regarding the care of
the child. 68 Maintenance of the status quo would thus refer to the
custodial parent's right to make a decision, not to maintaining a
static environment for the child. Judge Mosk suggests that the
"accustomed environment," controlled by the custodial parent, is
in the child's best interest. 69 The noncustodial parent's right thus
exists when he or she can show "new facts and circumstances
subsequent to the original custody order" 70 that signify that the
custodial parent does not act in the child's best interest. Judge
Mosk explains this rebuttable presumption by referring to the
noncustodial parent's right to object to the religious training of a
child. 71 Because the custodial parent presumptively acts_ in the
child's best interest, the noncustodial parent must overcome the
heavy burden of proving that the "health or well-being of the child
is being injured by the choice of religious practices.' ' 72
Legal antecedents, described in a statute and in case law,
further explain the custodial parent presumption. 73 A Pennsylvania
statute expressly describes the custodial parent's right to select a
name at birth: ''If the parents are divorced or separated at the time
of the child's birth, the choice of the surname rests with the parent
who has custody.'' 74 The appellate court of Louisiana expressed a
similar view in declaring that the noncustodial father bore the
burden of proving that the given name, rather than the surname,
was "detrimental to the present or future welfare of a child" who
was born pending a suit for the parents' separation. 75 A clear
statement that the custody of an infant is an important factor was
made by a superior court of New York: "[T]he significant
consideration is that the mother has custody and it is she who will
be the primary caretaking figure and who will make major
crucial in retaining his relationship with his father after his parents' marriage has
broken down. Unless this difference can be explained on the basis that in the latter
case the child has identified himself as a member of his father's family and that it
would be psychologically damaging and therefore contrary to his best interests if this
was disturbed as a result of a change of surname, it is difficult to see a reason for the
distinction.
Note, ChangeofChild'sName, 97 L.Q. REv. 197, 200(1981).
68. See, e.g., In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d at 649, 620 P.2d at 585, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 925 (Mosk,
J., concurring).
69. !d.
70. !d.
71. !d.
72. !d.
73. See gene>ally H. HILL KAY, SEx BASED DISCRIMINATION 171-77 (2d ed. 1981) (examines
relationship of father's primary right, the child's best interest test, and the custodial parent
presumption).
74. PA. STAT. tit. 28, § 1.7(b)(1975).
75. Webber v. Parker, 167 So. 2d 519, 522 (La. Ct. App.), writ denied, 246 La. 886, 168 So. 2d
269 (1964). See In re M.L.P., 621 S.W.2d 430 (Tex. Ct. App. 1981) (upheld custodial parent's
preference for given name).
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decisions" for the child. 76 In this case the court also considered the
child's wishes, 77 a common factor in custody suits. The court
presumed that the child would prefer to use the name of the parent
with whom she was living. 78
The custodial parent presumption thus accords with a court's
award of custody by affording the custodial parent the same
presumptive right to select or change a child's name as it does with
respect to the right to select or change a child's religion, education,
or general environment. A court's view of the custodial parent
presumption will thus logically relate to its approach to the
awarding of custody.
C. RELATIONSHIP OF THE CusTODIAL PARENT
PRESUMPTION To THE TENDER YEARS DocTRINE

When a court determines a child's best interest in a custody or
name change proceeding, its perception of the child's best interest
relates to its view of the tender years doctrine because both legal
concepts deal with related but distinct presumptions. The
presumption of the tender years doctrine is that if both parents of a
young child are fit, the mother is the better custodial parent. 79 A
court's view of this maternal presumption must be distinguished
from its interpretation of the gender neutral custodial parent
presumption.
In Devine v. DevineB 0 the Supreme Court of Alabama held the
tender years presumption to be an unconstitutional gender based
classification that discriminates between father and mother solely
on the basis of sex. 81 In making the custody determination gender
neutral, the court lists factors to be considered in awarding custody.
These factors are similar to those that courts have considered in
resolving naming disputes:
The sex and age of the children are indeed very important
considerations; however, the courts must go beyond these
to consider the characteristics and needs of each child,
including their emotional, social, moral, material and
educational needs; the respective home environments
76. State ex rei Spence-Chapin Servs. to Families & Children v. Tedeno, 101 Misc. 2d 485,
_,421 N.Y.S.2d297,300(Sup.Ct.l979).
77. !d. a t _ , 421 N.Y.S.2dat300.
78. /d.
79. Uviller, supra note 5, at 113-14.
80. 398So. 2d686(Ala. 1981).
81. Devine v. Devine, 398 So. 2d 686,695 (Ala. 1981).
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offered by the parties; the characteristics of those seeking
custody, including age, character, stability, mental and
physical health; the capacity and interest of each parent to
provide for the emotional, social, moral, material and
educational needs of the children; the interpersonal
relationship between each child and each parent; the
interpersonal relationship between the children; the effect
on the child of disrupting or continuing an existing
custodial status; the preference of each child, if the child is
of sufficient age and maturity; the report and
recommendation of any expert witnesses or other
independent investigator; available alternatives; and any
other relevant matter the evidence may disclose. 82
In listing these factors the court notes that the common law origin
of "the tender years presumption and the best interests of the child
[doctrine] have grown side by side. " 83 Therefore, courts have
presumed that the child's best interest means that the mother
should be the custodial parent. 84 Because of this historical
relationship the custodial parent presumption would be suspect in
those states that have not expressly abandoned or abolished the
tender years doctrine, 85 but only if those states failed to recognize
two important facts.
First, courts have traditionally interpreted the child's best interest in terms of the paternal naming right. 86 This discriminatory
practice of preserving the patronymic naming system was the
impetus for the Schiffman court's declaration that the child's best
82. !d. at 696-97. See Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d 71 (Alaska 1977); In reMarriage of Bowen,
219 N.W.2d683 (Iowa 1974); Christensen v. Christensen, 191 Neb. 355,215 N.W.2d Ill (1974).
83. Devine, 398 So. 2d at 696 n.8.
84. !d.
85. !d. at 691 n.4. The Devine court lists the following states as those retaining the tender years
doctrine: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois,
Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Texas, and Washington. The validity of the doctrine is questionable in the following states: Kansas,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, and Vermont. !d. at 691 n.5. Even in those states where there is a state's
equal right amendment or similar statutory language, the presumption remains valid: Louisiana,
Maryland, Minnesota, and Utah. !d. at 691 n.6. In the following 22 states the doctrine remains in
some form: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Idaho, Kentucky, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Rhode Island,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. !d.
at 691 n.3. But see, e.g., Uviller, supra note 5, at 114 (author interprets statutory silence on the subject
as an implied statement that the best interests of the child govern). Uviller, contrary to what she
believes are feminist views, supports the use of the maternal presumption, finding that the economic
context of custody suits will severely disadvantage women if the presumption is declared
unconstitutional. !d. at 117.
The presumption may be constitutional from the viewpoint of the United States Supreme
Court. See Arends v. Arends, 517 P.2d 1019, 1020 (Utah 1974) (custodial father of a one-year-old
girl whose mother had been psychotic was forced to relinquish custody to the mother who had
recovered when the child was four years old), cerl. denied, 419 U.S. 881 (1975).
86. Note, supra note 12, at 323.
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interest test means considering the child's best interests, not just the
paternal preferenceY In practice, courts did not relate the child's
best interests in resolving naming disputes to the pnor
determination of custody, even though ''the tender years
presumption and the best interests of the child have grown side by
side.' ' 88
The other important fact courts must recognize is that the
gender neutral language of the custodial parent presumption does
not violate the equal protection clause 89 of the United States
Constitution. 90 If the custodial parent presumption were
legislatively adopted 91 or judicially promulgated the language of the
presumption would be facially neutral. 92 Even though the
presumption would adversely affect men because courts
infrequently award custody to fathers, the classification does not
intentionally discriminate against men. 93 The classification does
not meet the "but for" test that signifies the presence of
discriminatory intent. 94 Deference to the custodial parent's
decision is not a euphemism for giving control to the mother. 95
Such deference simply recognizes the custodial parent's right to
make an important decision. 96
In conclusion, the right to select or change a child's name
logically coexists with other custodial rights. 97 To resolve the
naming dispute, a court need not reevaluate the traditional factors
comprising the child's best interest test because the award of
custody creates the presumption that the custodial parent's decision
is in the child's best interest. The noncustodial parent thus must
bear the burden of proving facts to show a change of conditions
subsequent to the original court determination of custody. The
rebuttable character of the custodial parent presumption, though
allowing judicial intervention upon a showing of significant facts,
87. In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d at 647, 620 P .2d at 583, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 922 ( 1980).
88. Devine v. Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 696 n.8 (Ala. 1981).
89. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1. Section 1 states: "No state shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.'' I d.
90. See generally Note, Discriminatory Purpose and Disproportionate Impact: An Assessment After ''Feeny, ''
79 CoLUM. L. REv. 1376 (1979) (heavy burden to show an equal protection violation).
91. See, e.g., PA. ADMIN. ConE§ 1.7(b) (Shepard's 1975) (codifies custodial parent's right to
name a newborn child).
·
92. Even a state disability program that excludes coverage for pregnancy did not violate the
equal protection clause. See Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484 (1974) (program divides recipients into
the groups of "pregnant women" and "nonpregnant persons").
93. The classification of custodial and noncustodial parent created by the presumption does not
bar the father from naming the child because the father can be the custodial parent. Personnel Adm' r
v. Feeny, 422 U.S. 256 (1979); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
94. See Feeny, 442 U.S. at 279.
95. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
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maintains the status quo by protecting the custodial parent's right
to make important legal decisions about a child's development.

III. THE LEGAL SIGNIFICANCE OF A NAME
Parental disputes about a child's name suggest the significance
of a name, 98 although the basis of the disagreement could be
acrimony between former spouses. 99 Judge Mask recognizes the
naming decision to be a significant decision. 100 Various aspects of a
name reveal the basis of this assumption: The common law and
statutory mechanisms provide means for effectuating the family's
right to select its members names. 101

A.

CoMMON LAw AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATIONs oF
NAMING

The essence of a common law name change is the consistent
use of a name, absent a fraudulent or deceitful motive. 102 This right
extends not only to adults but also to children. 103 This broad basis
for a name change continues today when courts hold that there is
no property interest in a name, 104 that a person's name need not be
98. Judge Mosk related the significance of a name decision to aspects of a child's well-being. In
re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d at 648, 620 P.2d at 584, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 923 (Mosk, J., concurring).
99. To protect the child's best interest some observers have argued that the custodial parent
should be sole arbiter of the noncustodial parent's visitation rights. See J. GoLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A.
SoLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST iNTERESTS OF THE CHILD 38 (1973). [n examining the tender years
doctrine, however, author Uviller believes that this proposal would "be strong incentive to yet
bloodier battles over which parents get custody in the first place." Uviller, supra note 5, at 117 n.29.
Acceptance of the custodial parent presumption may similarly, but to a lesser extent, heighten the
conflict in the original custody determination.
I 00. In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d at 648, 620 P. 2d at 584, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 923.
101. One writer has suggested that the court may find that the decision to select or change a
name is so significant that, even if the custodial parent presumptively acts in the child's best interest,
the court is the only proper forum for a name change, requiring a statute that abrogates the common
law right to change one's name at will, absent a fraudulent or illegal motive. Comment, Name Game,
supra note 13, at 150-51. But this view fails to account for the constitutionally protected right to
family autonomy. See irifi'a notes 190-201 and accompanying text.
The government may assert that it can restrict the selection of a name if the name is unduly
lengthy. See, e.g., Grand Forks Herald, June 4, 1982, at 3B (Kansas County Court denied petition
for the name ''Xartheonadjimadurokaszamnoupoulos' ').
102. Ex parte Snook, 2 Hilt. Rep. 566 (N.Y. 1859). See Smith v. Casualty Co., 197 N.Y. 420, 90
N.E. 947 (1910) (the name a person assumes, uses, and becomes known by "will constitute his legal
name just as much as if he had borne it from birth"); Comment, Name Game, supra note 13, at 142-60
(analysis of how courts have interpreted the common law and statutes). See generally Dwight, Proper
Names, 20 YALE L.J. 387 ( 1911 ); Gordon, Change of Patronymic, 56 CAN. L.J. I ( 1920).
103. In re Staros, .280 N. W.2d 409, 411 (Iowa 1979). The Staros court emphasized that the
California court in In re Trower, 260 Cal. App. 2d 75, 66 Cal. Rptr. 873 (Ct. App. 1968), failed to
supply any authority for the proposition that at common law a minor did not have a nght to a name
change. 280 N.W.2d at 411. See Burk v. Hammonds, 586 S.W.2d 307 (Ky. Ct. App. 1979) (child
may exercise common law right, but statutory right is vested in parent); Hall v. Hall, 30 Md. 214,
351 A.2d 917 (1976) (minor has right to common law and statutory name change, but court
determines child's best interest in statutory proceedings).
104. Hosmer v. Hosmer, 611 S.W.2d 32 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (a name cannot be consideration
for an antenuptial contract, for there is no legal right to preclude the giving of a paternal surname to
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the exclusive name, 105 or that a statute provides court documentation of a name change as an alternative to the common law
method. 106
A statute abrogates the broad common law right when a court
recognizes a liberty interest in a person's name 107 and declares that
the statute is the exclusive method for a name change. 108 One
writer has suggested that the apparent level of discretion exercised
by a court signifies its interpretation of statutes in relationship to
the common law: minimum, when the only basis for denial is
fraud; 109 intermediate, when the court considers other factors; 110
and maximum, when the court requires a showing of ''good
cause.'' 111
These different levels of discretion could affect a court's
interpretation of the custodial parent presumption. A court could
superimpose its level of discretion upon the weighing of the
presumption favoring the custodial parent: a minimal level of
discretion could give strength to the presumption, almost creating
categorical protection for the custodial parent's decision; and a
maximum level of discretion could weaken the presumption,
creating a balancing process, with the presumption characterized as
a thumb on the scale of the custodial parent. 112
In addition to the burden of proof suggested by statutes, 113 a
court may discern a heavy burden of proof for a noncustodial ,
parent seeking an injunction or other extraordinary relief. 114 The
a child). But see In re Douglas, 60 Misc. 2d 1057, 304 N.Y. S.2d 558 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (common law
would not recognize a one·word name, such as "Arindam").
105. See Secretary of Commonwealth v. City Clerk, 373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E.2d 717 (1977)
Oane Doe, who marries Richard Roe, may be Jane Roe and Mrs. Richard Roe, or a different
name); People v. Briggins, 50 N.Y.2d 302, 406 N.E.2d 766, 428 N.Y.S.2d 909 (1980) (husband
allowed to use a different name on a bank account to hide money from his wife). See also Note,
Surname Alternatives in Pennsylvania, 82 DicK. L. REv. I 0 I, II 0-13 ( 1977)(common law right to use two
surnames).
106. Comment, Name Game, supra note 13, at 144 (a method for a quick and efficient name
change).
I 07. Arnold, Personal Names, 15 YALE L.J. 227, 230-31 ( 1905). See, Comment, Name Game, supra
note 13, at 145 (a vociferous minority of jurisdictions interpret statutes as an abrogation of the
common law).
108. Comment, Name Game, supra note 13, at 145-49. Some implied requirements arising from
the abrogation· of the common law might be a showing that a change of name would not be
detrimental to the family unit, that a spouse consents, or that administrative burdens will not be
undue. Comment, Name Game, supra note 13, at 154-60.
109. Comment, Name Game, supra note 13, at 150-51.
110. Comment, Name Game, supra note 13, at 151-54 (factors include no evidence of harm, an
unopposed petition, and burden of proof on objecting third parties).
111. See, e.g., In re Mohlman, 26 N.C. App. 220, 216 S.E.2d 147 (Ct. App. 1975) (desire for
change is insufficient reason).
112. For an explanation of the protection afforded by categorical protection and by balancing,
see generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw§ 12, at 576-736 (1978).
113. A court may, however, deny a name change pursuant to a divorce statute, but grant a
name change pursuant to a general name statute. Ogle v. Circuit Court, 89 S.D. 18, _ _ , 227
N.W.2d 621,623 (1975).
114. See generally Annat., 92 A.L.R. 3o 1091, 1123-26 (1979) (injunction, mandamus, and
extraordinary relief).
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extraordinary nature of an injunction could suggest that a court
would give great weight to the custodial parent presumption.
A court will also interpret the presumption in light of the
family's interest in naming because the custodial parent
presumption describes a relationship between the custodial parent
and child and suggests a limited right in the noncustodial parent.
B.

THE FAMILY'S INTEREST IN A NAME

The court in resolving the naming dispute between two
parents may base its decision on how the law has recognized
various interests related to the family. Litigation concerning family
members has recognized four rights: 115 the husband-father's right
to his own name, the wife-mother's right to her own name, 116 the
paternal and maternal right to due process and equal protection,
and the parental right to name a child. How a court relates these
familial rights to the unit consisting of the custodial parent and
child logically depends upon the court's interpretation of what
constitutes ''a family.''
1. The Husband-Father's Right to His Own Name

At common law there was no interest in a name because a
person could change his name absent a fraudulent purpose. 117 But a
husband would sometimes adopt his wife's surname to receive a
substantial inheritance. 118 Today a husband may be unsuccessful in
asserting the exclusive right to his own name after a divorce. 119 In
115. The child's interest in his or her name is generally given some consideration, but the child's
preferences are not controlling. In re Saxton, 309 N.W.2d 298, 302 (Minn. !981), cert. denied, 10~ S.
Ct. 1737 (1982).
116. The Center for a Woman's Own Name stated that its position was that "the name(s) the
woman chooses to use is her own name. It may be the name given, a name assumed during
childhood, assumed at marriage, assumed at a previous marriage, a hyphenated name as in a name
made up by herself at any time." CENTER FOR A WoMAN's OwN NAME, BooKLET FOR WoMEN WHo
WtsH TO DETERMINE THEIR OwN NAME AFTER MARRIAGE 6 ( 1974 ). See also In re Schiffman, 28 Cal.
3d 640, 620 P.2d 579, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918 (1980) (court used the expression "birthname" in
substitution for the traditional label of "maiden name"). But see Secretary of Commonwealth v. City
Clerk, 373 Mass. 178, _ _ , 366 N .E.2d 717, 724 ( 1977) (maiden name "is the name used before her
first marriage"). Author Susan Ross interprets a woman's name in terms of patronymic naming:
The author finally decided on "father's name" because she wished to emphasize that
most people in our society still give their children the surname of the father. Many
feminists have been combatting the custom of a woman's changing her name to that of
the husband at marriage, but they have ignored the male-oriented system for naming
children. By using the term "father's name," the author hopes to encourage more
women to see and combat the second problem.
S. Ross, THE RtGHT oF WoMEN 254 n.1 (1973).
117./nreSnook, 2 Hilt. Rep. 566, 568(N.Y. Ct. C.P. 1859).
118. See Comment, Name Game, supra note !3, at 127 n.41.
119. See, e.g., Welcker v. Welcker, 342 So. 2d 251 (La. Ct. App. !977) (ex-husband could not
bar his ex-wife from using his surname even though they had been married less than a year).
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such a case a court reveals the continuing vitality of the common
law when granting, over objection, an ex-wife the right to use her
ex-husband's name 120 and when recognizing a wife's right to name
her children by a previous marriage. 121

2. The Wife-Mother's Right to Her Own Name
In contrast, the issue of a wife's right to use her own name, 122
rather than her husband's, demands a more thorough discussion of
the various situations in which courts gradually recognized this
right. 123 The term "lucy stoner" 124 signifies the onset of the
movement toward recognition of this right. In 1855 Lucy Stone
retained her birth name when she married Henry B. Blackwell. 125
Her influence later promptedjane Grant and Ruth Hale in 1921 to
found the Lucy Stone League. 126
In the 1970s the interest in women's names heightened when
the Supreme Court of the United States, in Forbush v. Wallace, 127
upheld Alabama's regulation requiring a woman to register for her
driver's license using her husband's surname. 128 The Court,
affirming per curiam, found the regulation to be rationally related
to the state's interest in custom, uniformity, and administrative
convenience. 129 Five years later, the district court of Kentucky in
Whitlow v. Hodges 130 found Forbush to be persuasive and upheld
Kentucky's unwritten regulation that required a woman to use her
husband's name to receive a driver's license. 131 The Supreme
Court of the United States denied certiorari. 132 In 1982, however,
120. Cowley v. Cowley, 1901 A.C. 450 (House of Lords allowed the ex-wife of Lord Cowley the
to be known as "Cowley" even though she had remarried).
121. Winkenhofer v. Griffin, 511 S.W.2d 216 (Ky. Ct. App. 1974) (Kentucky court rejected the
stepfather's claim that a name change will insinuate to the public that the child was his illegitimate
child). See generally In reDunston, 18 N.C. App. 647, 197 S.E.2d 560(Ct. App. 1973)(court allowed
the name change for a child who had been known for 15 years by her unwed father's name).
122. See generally Daum, supra note 13; Lamber, A Married Woman's Surname: Is Custom Lawi, 1973
WASH. U.L.Q. 779; Comment, Women's Name Rights, supra note 13, at 876; Comment, Name Game,
supra note 13, at 142.
123. See supra note 13.
124. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1344 (4th ed. 1976) (defines a "lucy
stoner" as "a female advocate of women's rights; esp: a married woman who uses her maiden name
as a surname'').
125. MacDougall, Married Women's Common Law Right to Their Own Surnames, I WoMEN's RIGHTS
L. REP. 2, 5 (1972).
126. !d.
127.341 F. Supp. 217 (M.D. Ala. 1971), a.fl'dpercuriam, 405 U.S. 970(1972).
128. Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217,223 (M.D. Ala. 1971), a.ff'dpercuriam, 405 U.S. 970
(1972).
129. 341 F. Supp. at 222. These interests, however, have not withstood judicial scrutiny when
the court discerns gender discrimination. See, e.g., Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77 (1971) (rejected
state's claim of administrative ease).
130.539 F.2d 582 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
131. Whitlow v. Hodges, 539 F.2d 582, 583-84 (6th Cir. ), cert. denied, 429 U.S. I 029 (1976).
132. 539 F.2d at 583-84.
right
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the Supreme Court of Alabama 133 overruled Forbush, declaring that
Forbush did not accurately state the broad right to a common law
name change. 134
The Forbush and Whitlow decisions of the 1970s did not,
however, preclude women from using their names in this context
and others. Other courts interpreted their state common law and
held that the common law did not require a married woman to
assume her husband's name. 135 Therefore, by finding their
common law different from Alabama's, state courts have
recognized a woman's right to retain her name upon marriage. 136
A few months after Forbush, the Maryland Court of Appeals
recognized a woman's right to register to vote using her own
name, 137 and the Arkansas statutory requirement of registering as
''Ms.'' or ''Mrs.'' was later declared unconstitutional. 138 Courts
soon recognized a woman's right to use her birth name in a variety
of contexts: the right to confirm her decision with a court order, 139
the right to resume her name after having previously used her
husband's, 140 the right to use general name change statutes even if
divorce laws bar change, 141 the right to register for group
insurance, 142 the right to obtain a driver's license, 143 and the right
133. State v. Taylor, 415 So. 2d 1043 (Ala. 1982).
134. !d. at 1047. The Taylor court quoted Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, 226 N.W.2d 458
(1975), for an accurate statement of the common law right:
When a woman on her marriage assumes, as she usually does in England . . . the
surname of her husband in substitution for her father's name, it may be said that she
acquires a new name by repute .... The change of name is in fact, rather than in law,
a consequence of the marriage.
415 So. 2d at 1047.
The Taylor decision also undermines the holding of Whitlow, 539 F.2d 582 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1029 (1976), because the Whitlow court adopted the Forbush court's rationale. Whitlow, 593
F.2d at 583-84. See Memorandum, Kv. DEPT. TRANSP. (Oct. 30, 1981) (Kentucky Department of
Transportation allowed to issue driver's licenses to married women in their own names).
135. See, e.g., Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, 226 N.W.2d 458 (1975) (court did not mention
Alabama and Kentucky's unusual interpretation of the common law).
136. See, e.g., In re Natale, 527 S.W.2d 402, 406-07 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (right to resume
birth name after using husband's surname).
137. Stuart v. Board of Supervisors, 266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972) (Maryland Court of
Appeals held that the statute requiring the filing of former and present names changed by marriage
did not abrogate the common law). See generally MacDougall, supra note 125.
138. Walker v.Jackson, 391 F. Supp. 1395 (E.D. Ark. 1975).
139. E.g., Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, _ _ , 226 N.W.2d 458, 466 (1975).
140. In re Hauptly, 262 Ind. 150, _ _ , 312 N.E.2d 857,860 (1974); In re Natale, 527 S.W.2d
402, 407 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
141. Ogle v. Circuit Court, 89 S.D. 18, 23, 227 N.W.2d 621,624-25 (1975); In re Harris, 236
S.E.2d426,430(W. Va.1977).
142. Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d 138, _ _ , 226 N.W.2d 458, 466 (1975). The Wisconsin court
explicitly rejected the 1945 Illinois case ofRago v. Lipsky, 327111. App. 63,63 N.E.2d 642 (App. Ct.
1945). Kruzel, 67 Wis. 2d at 146, 226 N. W.2d at 462. The Rago court had held that at common law a
married woman must use her husband's name as her own. Rago, 327 Ill. App. at __ , 63 N.E.2d at
644. In 1974 the Attorney General of Illinois had repudiated Rago by issuing two opinions which
recognized a married woman's right to vote and to drive using her own name. 5 Op. Att'y Gen. Ill.
695 (Feb. 13, 1974); 5 Op. Au'yGen. Ill. 711 (Feb. 25, 1974).
143. Davis v. Roos, 326 So. 2d 226, 229 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976); Traugott v. Petit, _ _ R.I.
_ , _ , 404 A.2d 77, 80 (1979).

NoTE

811

to sue for a divorce in a surname different from the husband's. 144
These rights accrued to a woman as a wife or as an ex-wife. 145
Some courts have similarly interpreted a woman's right to her
own name as an individual right, regardless of her status as a
mother. 146 Yet, this perspective may assume that the mother acts in
the child's best interest when deciding to use her birth name. 147
The right of a mother or father, a wife or a husband, to her or
his own name is thus as broad as the courts' interpretation of the
common law and statutes. 148 Litigation in the 1970s reveals that the
common law and statutes protected a woman's right to her name
during a marriage. Within the marriage each spouse had a right to
his or her name. The interpretation of common law also supported
recognition of a woman's right to continue to use her husband's
name that she had adopted as her own even after a divorce. 149
3. The Paternal and Maternal Right to Due Process and Equal
Protection

When divorce involves a family of three or more 150 or when a
father acknowledges paternity, 151 courts have analyzed the paternal
and maternal rights involved in the legal proceedings for a child's
name change. 152
144. Malone v. Sullivan, 124 Ariz. 469, _ _ , 605 P.2d 447,650 (1980); Weathers v. Superior
Court, 54 Cal. App. 3d 286, 289, 126 Cal. Rptr. 547, 549 (Ct. App. 1976); Simmons v. O'Brien,
201 Neb. 778, _ _ , 272 N.W.2d 273, 274 (1978).
145. The woman's right to her own name appeared as an individual right based on the common
law freedom to choose a name absent fraudulent purpose. MacDougall, supra note 125, at 3.
146. In re Darks, 98 Ill. App. 3d 1046, _ _ , 425 N .E.2d 49, 49 (App. Ct. 1981); Klein v. Klein,
36 Md. App. 177, _ _ , 373 A.2d 86, 89 (Ct. Spec. App. 1977); Piotrowski v. Piotrowski, 71 Mich.
App. 213, _ _ , 247 N.W.2d 354, 356 (Ct. App. 1976); Moskowitz v. Moskowitz, 118 N.H. 199,
_ _ , 385 A.2d 120, 123 (1978); Egnerv. Egner, 133 N.J. Super. 403, _ _ , 337 A.2d 46,49 (Sup.
Ct. App. Div. 1975); Meadows v. Meadows, 312 N.W.2d 464, 468 (N.D. 1981); Sneed v. Sneed,
585 P.2d 1363, 1366 (Okla. 1978); Elwell v. Elwell, 132 Vt. 73, _ _ , 313 A.2d 394, 395 (1973).
147. When a woman has the right to use her own name, some couples agree that their future
children will receive the paternal name to alleviate any judicial fear that a child will not receive the
traditional paternal surname. In re Miller, 218 Va. 939, 243 S.E.2d 464, 467 (1978); In reStrikwerda,
216 Va. 470, _ _ , 220 S.E.2d 245, 246 (1975). An Illinois court, however, has explicitly rejected the
idea that a mother's right to her own name is related to the child's best interests:
The best interests of the child are to be considered by the trial court in selecting the
custodial parent. The name which the parent uses has not been held to be one of the
relevant factors. The welfare of the child becomes an important consideration where
the custodial parent petitions to change the name of the minor child [citations
omitted], but not where the custodial parent seeks to change his or her own name.
Thomas v. Thomas, 100 Ill. App. 3d 1080, _ _ , 427 N.E.2d 1009, 1010 (App. Ct. 1981). See May
v. May, 6 Kan. App. 2d 24, 626 P.2d 801 (Ct. App. 1981) (even when there are children,
"restoration of the wife's maiden or former name, upon her request, is mandatory").
148. See Comment, Name Game, supra note 13, at 143-58.
149. Cowley v. Cowley, 1901 A.C. 450, 455; Welcker v. Welcker, 342 So. 2d 251, 254 (La. Ct.
App. 1977); Lindsey v. Lindsey, 564 S.W.2d 143, 146 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978).
!50. See generally Annat., supra note 6.
151. See infra notes 162-64 and accompanying text.
152. Most name cases concern changing a child's name. See generally Annat., supra note 6. But see
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Courts, when considering the traditional paternal naming
right, have used various adjectives to describe the legal significance
·of a name. 153 In examining the nature of the father's naming right
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in In re Tubbs 154 stated that
''quality of notice that is a person's due is determined by the
essential character of the interest sought to be affected.'' 155 In
noting that "personal rights [are] more precious than those of
property" 156 the Tubbs court held the father's liberty interest made
service by publication void. 157 It narrowed this holding, however,
requiring personal notice only when the father's whereabouts are
"known or readily ascertainable. " 158
The Tubbs court recognized that other courts have not found
the paternal naming right to be a property right protected by the
due process clause of the Constitution. 159 The court nonetheless
found that the father had a liberty interest because the paternal
naming right is similar to essential rights, basic civil rights, and
fundamental rights. 160 The court stated that the interest arising
from the parental bond is the subject of constitutional protection
under both the due process and equal protection clauses. 161
When courts recognize a maternal liberty interest protected by
the due process clause and the equal protection clause, 162 the
infra text accompanying notes 186-97 for a discussion of the l'arents' right to select a child's birth
name.

153. The Supreme Court of Oklahoma expressed the traditional deference toward the father's
preference as "a natural right, a fundamental right, a primary or time-honored right, a common-law
right, a protectible interest, and even a legal right." In re Tubbs, 620 P.2d 384, 386 (Okla. 1980). See
Carroll v. Johnson, 263 Ark. 280, 565 S.W.2d 10 (1978) (change of minor child's name without
notice to noncustodial parent deprived parent of due process of law); Fulghum v. Paul, 229 Ga. 463,
192 S.E.2d 376 (1972) (publication of proposed change of child's name was sufficient notice to father
who has a protectable interest).
Courts usually consider the paternal preference rather than the maternal preference because in
most situations the married parents give the child the father's name. Yet, "[t]here are no reported
cases to the knowledge of [attorney Priscilla Ruth MacDougall] which involve a man's trying to
change the name of his marital child given its mother's name at birth when he has custody of the
child. Nor is there any such case when the man does not have custody." Petitioner's Brief for
Certiorari at 26, In re Saxton, 309 N. W. 2d 298 (Minn. 1981 ), cert. denied, 102 S. Ct. 1737 ( 1982).
154. 620 P.2d 384 (Okla. 1980).
155. In re Tubbs, 620 P.2d 384, 386 (Okla. 1980).
156. !d. But see Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972). The Lynch court
reasoned that "[t]he dichotomy between personal liberties and property rights is a false one.
Property does not have rights. People have rights." !d. at 552.
157.620 P.2d at 388.
158. !d. See Hardy v. Hardy, 269 Md. App. 412, 306 A.2d 244 (Ct. Spec. App. 1973)
(remanded because publication was waived when whereabouts of father was known).
159. 620 P.2d at 387. See Fulghum v. Paul, 229 Ga. 463, 192 S.E.2d 376 (1972). The Fulghum
court stated the following:
[T]his "protectible interest" is not a property right which comes within the meaning
of the due process clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions. In our opinion such
interest necessarily is taken into consideration by the trial court in ... carrying out its
duty of acting in the best interests of the child as parens patriae.
229 Ga. at _ _ , 192 S.E.2d at 378.
160. In re Tubbs, 620 P.2d at 387.
161. !d.
162. See, e.g., Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 782-83 (M.D. Ala. 1976) ("liberty interest at
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context is usually a paternity proceeding. 163 Statutes that
automatically name a child with the father's surname upon
recognition of paternity violate the mother's right to notice and
equal protection. 164
Courts therefore require that both the father and mother
receive notice of a name change. This requirement, however, is not
inconsistent with the custodial parent presumption, although
according to the theoretical framework the noncustodial parent
would presume that the custodial parent has the right to change a
child's name. 165 The requirement of notice is comparable to the
statutory requirement of notice to third parties, even though the
petitioner has a common law right to adopt any nonfraudulent
name. 166 In addition, the requirement of notice to the noncustodial
parent would mitigate the noncustodial's concern that the child's
name would be surreptitiously changed. Notice would therefore
protect a parent's constitutional right to due process and equal
protection and lessen a noncustodial parent's apprehension.
4. The Parental Right to Name

Even if a parent does have a constitutional right to procedural
due process and equal protection, 167 the constitutional right of
family autonomy and privacy give support to the custodial parent's
presumptive naming right. 168 In order to recognize the relationship
between the custodial parent's right to make significant decisions
about the child's welfare 169 and the presumptive right to select a
name for his or her child, courts will accept the custodial parent's
naming right if they discern that naming is an incident of
custody . 170 Courts will grant constitutional protection to the
custodial parent's decision if they view the custodial parent and
child as a family to which the constitutional rights of family
autonomy and privacy accrue.
a. Naming as an Incident of Custody
stake" and automatic paternal preference violates equal protection clause); jones v. McDowell, 53
N.C. App. 434, 281 S.E.2d 192 (Ct. App. 1981) (liberty interest and equal protection violated by
automatic change to paternal surname upon acknowledgement of paternity).
163. Sometimes a court will deny jurisdiction to change a child's name in a paternity
proceeding. See, e.g., Dana A. v. Harry M. W., 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2242 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. June 1,
1982) (father can "pursue other avenues").
164. Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769, 782-83 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Jones v. McDowell, 53 N.C.
App. 434, _ _ , 281 S.E.2d 192, 197 (Ct. App. 1981).
165. See infra text accompanying notes I 71-83.
166. Seesupra text accompanying notes I 02-11.
167. See supra text accompanying notes 150-64.
168. See infra text accompanying notes !86-201.
!69. See supra text accompanying notes 15-19.
170. See infra text accompanying notes 171-83.
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Courts may be reluctant to accept the proposition that naming
is an incident of custody because granting the custodial parent the
presumptive right to select a name for a child might make the
determination of custody more difficult. 171 But courts have faced
similar problems in deciding which parent will be the custodial parent and who will therefore have the right to control the child's
development. 172 By separating the naming right from the other
incidents of custody, courts have in effect fostered litigation. 173 As
one court noted, "the chances of [children] developing emotional
problems as they grow up increases in direct proportion to the
thickness of the file involved in a divorce case.'' 174 Two facts
support the proposition that naming is an incident of custody.
First, noncustodial parents often invoke a court's jurisdiction
by using divorce or separation decrees. 175 An Illinois court
explicitly stated that ''a change of name of a minor child of
divorced parents is [a] matter incidental to the custody.'' 176
Second, the nature of the relationship between the custodial
parent and the child indicates that the custodial parent guides the
child's development. 177 Yet, courts that have upheld the traditional
paternal naming preference have used this fact, not to support the
custodial parent's decision, but rather to find that custody
weakened the bond between the noncustodial parent and child. 178
When these courts interpret the effect of custody as detrimental,
they assume that the name creates the bond between the absent
noncustodial parent and child, a bond they often describe as
tenuous at best. 179 Yet, in few appellate name dispute cases have
the fathers who have wanted their children to retain their surnames
sought custody . 180 In some cases these fathers were even reluctant
171. See, e.g., Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 317 N. W .2d 381 (1982) (no presumption exists in
favor of the custodial parent, but custody is a factor in determining the best interests of the child); Ex
parte Stull, _ _ S.C. _ _ , 280 S.E.2d 209 (1981) (remanded to determine whether the proposed
name change ''is actually the minor's decision rather than that of his cu•todial parent"). But see State
ex rd. Spence-Chapin Servs. to Families & Children v. Tedeno, 101 Misc. 2d 485, 421 N. Y .S.2d 297
(Sup. Ct. 1979) ("the mother has custody and it is she who will ... make major decisions").
172. See Devine v. Devine, 398 So. 2d 686, 696 (Ala. 1981) (court discards tender years
presumption even though the presumption is an "anodyne" for the difficult decisions confronting
the court in custody proceedings).
173. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
174. King v. King, 10 Or. App. 324, _ _ , 500 P.2d 267, 269 (Ct. App. 1972).
175. Set, e.g., Annat., supra note 6, at 1118-23 (incident to divorce and separation proceedings).
But see Hurta v. Hurta, 25 Wash. App. 95, 605 P.2d 1278 (Ct. App. 1979) (no jurisdiction
subsequent to dissolution); Annat., supra note 6, at 1107-18, 1123-26 Uurisdiction present in
statutory proceedings and in extraordinary relief).
176. Solomon v. Solomon, 5 III. App. 2d 297, _ _ , 125 N.E.2d 675, 678 (App. Ct. 1955).
1 77. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 26-42.
179. See, e.g., Mark v. Kahn, 333 Mass. 517, 131 N .E.2d 758 (1956).
180. Brief for Appellant in Support of Motion for Rehearing at 17, Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neh.
855,317 N.W.2d 381 (1982).
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to acknowledge paternity .tat
The relationship between the custodial parent and child,
however, is built upon the custodial parent's right to direct the
child's development- psychological, educational, and religious.t 82
Because a name can have psychological, educational, and religious
significance,t 83 a custodial parent should also determine a child's
name. The selection of a name would thus be one aspect of the
custodial parent's duty to direct the development of a child's
identity.
b. The Custodial Parent and Child as a Family
The phrase ''broken home'' is a common expression used to
describe a family that experienced divorce. While this expression
indicates that a child's parents live in separate residences, the
metaphor does not account for the daily responsibilities that a
custodial parent possesses. The central reason for recognizing the
custodial parent and child as a family is the similarity between the
autonomous acts of a custodial parent and the autonomous acts of
parents.t 84 Although this reason is logically intertwined with the
recogmtwn of naming as an incident of custody, tas it is
distinguishable in this context because the emphasis is on the
custodial parent's authority to act, not upon the individual
decisions that a custodial parent makes. A discussion of the
authority vested in parents reveals the similar authority of the
custodial parent.
Three cases describe the protection afforded to parents in
selecting a name for their child. In Secretary of Commonwealth v. City
Clerk of Lowellt 86 the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in 1977
declared unlawful the town clerk's refusal to follow the three state
attorney general opinions that recognized the common law freedom
to select any nonfraudulent name. 187 The court held that the
common law protected the parents' decision.tsa The naming right
181. See Cohee v. Cohee, 210 Neb. 855, 317 N. W .2d 381 (1982).
182. See supra text accompanying notes 16-19.
183. Some psychologists have conducted studies of children's names. See Busse, Identical First
Names for Parent and Child, 107 J. Soc. PsYcH. 293 (1979); Eagleson, Students' Reactions to Their Given
Names, 23 J. Soc. PsYCH. 187 (1946); Ellis & Beechley, Emotional Disturbance in Children with Peculiar
Given Names, 85 J. GENETIC ?sYCH. 337 (1954); Nelson, First-Name Stereotypes and Expected Academic
Achievement of Students, 41 PsYCH. REP. 1343 (1977).
A name also has cultural and educational significance. See, e.g., Note, supra note 12, at 303 (a
name may instruct children in familial and societal values).
184. See infra text accompanying notes !86-201.
185. See supra text accompanying notes I 72-83.
186. 373 Mass. 178, 366 N.E.2d 717 (1977).
187. Secretary of Commonwealth v. City Clerk, 373 Mass. 178, _ _ , 366 N.E.2d 717, 722
(1977).
188. !d. at _ _ , 366 N.E.2d at 725.
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was even sufficiently broad to protect a foolish decision. 189 The
court stated that the "[p ]arents' claim to authority in their own
household to direct the rearing of their children is basic to the
structure of society. '' l9o
Two years later in jech v. Burch, 191 a federal district court in
Hawaii recognized that this common law freedom was protected by
the fourteenth amendment. 192 Even though the court noted that no
case had previously dealt with the constitutional dimensions of
naming, 193 it found that the "naming of one's own child comes
with this [the preamble of the Constitution] catalogue of blessings
of liberty. " 194 The court therefore protected the parents' right to
give their child a name derived from both their surnames. 195
jech was found controlling in the 1981 decision of 0 'Brien v.
Tilson. 196 A district court in North Carolina held that a statute
which required children of married parents to be given their
father's surname was unconstitutional because it infringed upon
the important constitutional interests affecting family life,
procreation, child rearing, privacy, and individual expression. 197
189. !d. at _ _ , 366 N.E.2d at 724.
190. /d. at _ _ , 366 N .E.2d at 723. A case comment summarizes the liberty afforded to parents
in this case:
(T]his decision extended the common law principle of freedom to choose a name to
include the right of parents to give their child whatever surname they desire, including
one not borne by either parent. It became a "short step" for the court to approve the
use of a hyphenated version of both parents surnames in the recording of a child's
surname. This freedom and authority stems from the concept of family autonomy.
Comment, Recording of Surnames - Clerks Have No Authority to Inhibit the Rights of Individuals to Choose
Their Own and Their Children's Surnames. Secretary of the Commonwealth v. City Clerk of Lowell, 13 NEw
ENc. L. Rev. 588, 593 (1977)(footnotes omitted).
191.466 F. Supp. 714(D. Hawaii 1979).
192. Jech v. Burch, 466 F. Supp. 714, 719 (D. Hawaii 1979). The court stated that "a proper
interpretation of Anglo-American political and legal history and precedent leads to the conclusion
that parents have a common law right to give their child any name they wish, and that the
Fourteenth Amendment protects this right from arbitrary state action." /d. The court further
explained that "the statutory provision for a name change is not a substitute for the right to insist
that one's child at birth was given the original name designated.'' /d. at 720 (emphasis in original).
193. !d. at 719.
194. !d. To support recognition of the parents' constitutional naming right, a right derived from
the rights to liberty and privacy, the district court cited the following cases: Smith v. Organization of
Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816 (1977) (foster parents may have a protected
liberty interest); Cleveland Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (right of pregnant
woman to continue working); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to terminate pregnancy);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right to contraceptives); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (right to teach children a foreign language).
195. 466 F. Supp. at 721. Parents named their child "Jebef," a combination ofjech and Befurt.
/d.

196.523 F. Supp. 494(E.D.N.C. 1981).
197. O'Brien v. Tilson, 523 F. Supp. 494, 496 (E.D.N.C. 1981). The court stated that the
interest of the Registrar of Vital Statistics could be one of developing a filing system that identifies
children by "A-I, A-2, and A-3, or Huey, Duey and Louey" as long as parents have the right to
choose the child's surname at birth. !d. at497. See Rice v. Department of Health and Rehab. Servs.,
386 So. 2d 844 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980). The Rice court, though remanding to an agency before
reaching the constitutional question, articulated the factors to be considered in examining the
constitutionality of a statute requiring the father's name to be given at birth. /d. at 849-50. The
dissent vehemently criticized the decision to remand: "What is to be lost is obvious: time, money
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Although these three cases involve parents who agree on the
name of their child, the cases nonetheless support recognition of the
custodial parent's right to select a name because the cases the courts
cited to support the holdings give broad deference to family
autonomy . 198 Cases that protect parental authority in the areas of
education and religion 199 support the custodial parent presumption
because this authority is vested in the custodial parent. 200 The
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the family's special status in
stating that ''freedom of personal choice in matters of family
life . . . [is] a fundamental liberty interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.' ' 201
The custodial parent and child are a family because of the
degree of control that the custodial parent exercises. 202 At common
law this control would give the custodial parent the title of'' head of
household. " 203 As head of household the custodial parent would
have the exclusive right to determine the surname of legitimate
children. 204 But courts used the title almost exclusively in
relationship to men, 205 even if they did not live at home, did not
support the family, or were supported by their wives. 206 The advent
of the Married Women's Property Act, however, freed women
from this legally inferior status. 207 The recognition of the custodial
parent presumption would similarly discard the implicit preference
of male control in naming under the guise of preserving a paternal
bond. 208 With the abolition of the tender years doctrine that
preserved the anachronistic, sex-stereotype view that a mother was
presumptively a better parent for a young child, 209 courts can
therefore be free of both stereotypes that interfere with ascertaining
the child's best interest - the focus of their inquiry in determining
and peace-of~ mind for individuals relegated by the majority to the administrative morass." !d. "'
854.
198. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (right of extended family members
to live together); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to educate children in a
private school).
199. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (right to rear children in accordance
with parental religious beliefs); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to educate
children in private school); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to teach children a
foreign language).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 73-77.
201. Santosky v. Kramer, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1394 (1982).
202. See supra notes 16-19, 184-97 and accompanying text.
203. Carlsson, supra note 37, at 563.
204. Carlsse>n, supra note 37, at 563.
205. Carlsson, supra note 37, at 563-68.
206. Carlsson, supra note 37, at 563-68.
207. In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 643, 620 P.2d 579, 581, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918, 920 (1980)
("In the mid-19th century Married Women's Property Acts returned to wives a separate legal
identity.").
208. See supra text accompanying notes 27-42.
209. See supra notes 79-85 and accompanying text.
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custody. Once the court determines custody, the right to family
autonomy would therefore vest in the custodial parent.

IV. A COURT'S USE OF THE CUSTODIAL PARENT
PRESUMPTION
To employ the custodial parent presumption a court must first
determine who is the custodial parent. 210 After such a
determination a court must weigh the evidence offered by the
noncustodial parent that shows new facts and changed
circumstances subsequent to the custody determination. 211 Both
steps present a court with different degrees of difficulties depending
upon specific facts.
A. DETERMINING THE CusTODIAL PARENT

The problem of ascertaining who has custody, though
seemingly resolved at the original custody determination, arises
from the theory that custody is a bundle of rights and
responsibilities. 212 When a parent abandons a child the parent is
noncustodial because no ties bind the child and the parent. 213 But
when a parent has a right to visitation a court may determine
custody by clocking the amount of time a child spends with a
parent 214 or by considering the quality of that time, namely
whether the parent provides what is traditionally described as a
home. 215
If parents equally provide a home for the child, 216 then the
court may consider the factor of financial responsibility. 217 A court,
however, should not consider this factor if the previous marriage
adversely influenced the present economic status of an individual
210. See justice v. Hobbs, 245 Iowa 707, 63 N. W .2d 882 ( 1954) ("custody" is a slippery word).
211. In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640, 650, 620 P.2d 579, 585, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918, 924 (1980)
(Mask, J., concurring).
212. H. CLARK, DoMESTic RELATIONs 573 (1968).
213. Abandonment demands definition, for one of the residual parental rights that remains after
custody is placed in another includes the right to have the child bear the parent's name. L.A.M. v.
State, 547 P.2d827, 833 n.13(Aiaska 1976).
214. But seeM. MoRGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, JoiNT CusTODY 30 (1981) ("[t]he central issue [in
joint custody] is not how much time the child spends with each parent but that the two parents have
equal rights and responsibilities for childrearing. '').
215. See generalry Blustein, supra note 15, at 11 7-21.
216. The act of quantifying time spent with each parent may ignore th~ reality of child rearing,
for a child who is at least five years old may have the opportunity to be with the noncustodial parent
only during summer vacation. M. MoRGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, supra note 214, at 30.
217. Some courts have explicitly recognized the factor of financial responsibility in terms of the
traditional paternal preference. See, e.g., In re Harris, 236 S.E.2d 426 (W. Va. 1977) ("The weight of
authority appears to be that absent extreme circumstances a father who exercises his parental rights
has a protectable interest in his children bearing his surname and this interest is one quid pro quo of his
reciprocal obligation of support and maintenance.'')

NoTE

819

parent 218 or if this factor does not directly relate to the essential
nurturing quality of a parent. 219 Therefore, the determination of
custody theoretically appears as a continuum, with one end
symbolizing abandonment and the other, equal responsibilities.
In practice the issue of who is the custodial parent is generally
resolved by a court's requiring proof of legal custody demonstrated
by a previous court order or proof of actual custody documented by
an affidavit. 220 When a court decree indicates an award of joint
custody the custodial parent presumption would be inapplicable
and a court would determine the child's best interests. But once it
finds custody vested in one parent, a court would next address the
noncustodial parent's burden of proof necessary to rebut the
presumption that the custodial parent acts in the child's best
interests.
B.

DETERMINING NEW FACTS AND CHANGED CIRCUMSTANCES

Once the court ascertains who is the custodial parent, it must
determine whether "new facts and changed circumstances',' exist
subsequent to the original custody order. 221 This issue can also be
expressed in other terms, either specifically as described in custody
statutes or case law 222 or generally as "against the child's best
interest'' because the custodial parent presumptively acts in the
child's best interest. 223 Two circumstances suggest a decided
change in the status quo- remarriage and relocation. 224
Remarriage by the custodial parent not only provides a child
with a stepparent but may also offer siblings from the new parent's
218. The thesis of Uviller's article is that the standard for custody should be based upon each
party's sacrifice of time and energy during the marriage. Uviller, supra note 5, at 112. Uviller also
notes that other factors would unduly influence the award of custody to the male parent: financial
consideration, amount of education, and possibility of remarriage. Uviller, supra note 5, at 112.
219. Psychologists Goldstein, Freud, and Solnit describe the psychological parent as "one who,
on a continuing, day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship, interplay, and mutuality,
fulfills the child's psychological needs for a parent, as well as the child's physical needs." J.
GoLDSTEIN, A. FREUD & A. SoLNIT, supra note 99, at 98.
220. When a court receives affidavits from both parents, it may resolve the issue based on its
theory of custody. See supra text accompanying notes 212-19. A court may also view the parents as
having joint custody. See supra note 214.
221. "New facts and changed circumstances" is the standard in California for considering a
change in custody. In reMarriage of Carney, 24 Cal. 3d 725, 730, 598 P.2d 36, 39, 157 Cal. Rptr.
383' 385 ( 1979).
222. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE AcT § 409 (1979) (previously unknown facts or
change in circumstances of child or custodian, and modification necessary to serve best interest of
child); In re Wheat, 68 Ill. App. 3d 4 71, 386 N. E.2d 278 (App. Ct. 1979) (substantially changed
circumstances).
223. In re Schiffman, 28 Cal. 3d 640,648, 620 P.2d 579, 584, 169 Cal. Rptr. 918,923 (1980)
(Mosk, J., concurring).
224. Authors Morgenbesser and Nehls specifically mention remarriage and relocation as two
circumstances that create problems in joint custody cases. M. MoRGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, joiNT
CusTODY 111-18 (1981). The authors, who advocate joint custody, unfortunately do not describe
how a court should address these problems.
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previous marriage or from the new marriage. 225 The remarriage of
the noncustodial parent may similarly result in new relationships,
yet those relationships may not have the same effect on the child's
immediate social environment. 226
A change in the physical environment through relocation of
either parent affects the bond between the noncustodial parent and
child. 227 To consider this circumstance in the context of who
initiates the move may impair the constitutional rights of family
autonomy 228 and travel. 229
Although both remarriage and relocation do alter the status
quo, the court may interpret these circumstances differently. When
the custodial parent remarries or relocates the court may support
the presumption by assuming that the custodial parent will
continue to act in the child's best interest. 230 This interpretation of
the status quo examines the custodial parent's ability to make
significant decisions, not the environment of the child. If a court
relates the status quo to a child's environment, then it would
consider how the custodial parent's remarriage or relocation affects
the child's environment.
When the noncustodial parent remarries the court may
require other evidence of a change in the status quo because this
remarriage may have a less direct impact upon the child. 231 When
the noncustodial parent relocates the court may evaluate the
continuing vitality of the noncustodial parent-child bond in light of
its previous character. 232 A court's consideration of the bond
between the noncustodial parent and child signifies that it
interprets the status quo as a change in a child's environment, not
as a question of the custodial parent's ability to act in the child's
best interest. 233
225. An analysis of how remarriage affects a child logically must encompass the specific fiH·ts of
each case. How a court interprets the facts depends upon its interpretation of what constinJtes a
''family.'' See supra text accompanying notes 202-09.
226. See supra text accompanying notes 202-04.

227. M. MoRGENBESSER & N. NEHLS, .Jot NT CusTonv 115-18 ( 1981 ).
228. Family au!Onomy derives from vdrious sources. See Caban v. Mohommad, 441 U.S. 3BIJ
(1979) (equal protection on the basis of sex); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 559 (1978j (equal protenion on
the basis of illegitimacy); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (proc .. dural due process); Wisconsin,._
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (first amendment religion); Tinker v. Des Moines School Distri,t, 3'-J:l
L:.S. 503 (1969) (first amendment speech).
229. The right 10 travel interstate is grounded upon the privileges and immunities clause of
article IV, section 2 of the United States Constitution. Paul v. Virginia, 75 C.S. (8 Wall) 16B, ISO
(1868); Corficld v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546,552 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 182:{)(No. 3230).
230. For a discussion ofthe significance of presumptions, see supra note 62.
231. The amount of weight a court gives to the fact of remarriage depends upon its interpretation of presumptions. Seesupra note 62.
2:12. A court's consideration of the previous character relates to Uviller's thesis that the court
should originally award custody on the basis of the sacrifice oftimt· and energy during the marrial(e.
U"illcr, supra note 5, at 117-30.
233. This interpretation of the status quo would silllilarly :d'fi:ct a ·:ourt's evalu;,tion of the
custodial parent's rcn1arriage or relocation.
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The facts of each case thus invite judicial discretion when the
court must define custody and new circumstances. Discretion does
not, however, necessarily invoke a balancing process that
undermines the custodial parent presumption's value in keeping
quarrelling parents from seeking vexatious suits. 234 The custodial
parent presumption describes a rebuttable presumption. 235 An
inference 236 would afford too little protection to a child used as a
pawn by angry parents, while a conclusive presumption 237 would
probably be an unconstitutional infringement of liberty. 238 The
gender neutral language of the custodial parent presumption is also
consistent not only with recent decisions concerning sex
discrimination 239 but also with the advancement of women's rights
in the 1970s. 240
A disadvantage of the model may be that the practical
application mandates judicial discretion. 241 Yet, judicial discretion
may be viewed as a necessary element in the area of domestic
relations, where each family offers unique circumstances. The
custodial parent presumption provides a structure for such judicial
discretion. 242 The presumption is therefore one that is rebuttable
yet possesses substance.

V. CONCLUSION
A court may resolve the controversy over a child's name by
2~4. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 62. See generally F. jAMES & G. HAZARD, CtVIL PROCEDURE 253-61 (2d ed.
1977).
236. Inferences are defined as "deciuctions or conclusions which with reason and common sense
lead the jury to draw from facts which have been established by the evidence in the case.'' BLACK's
LAW DICTIONARY 700 (5th ed. 1979).
237. A conclusive presumption is defined as "[a]n artificially compelling force which requires
[the] trier of fact to find such fact as is conclusively presumed and which renders evidence to the
contrary inadmissible." !d. at 263.
238. See, e.g., Roe v. Conn, 417 F. Supp. 769 (M.D. Ala. 1976). The Alabama court held that
an illegitimate child's liberty interest was unconstitutionally infringed upon by the complete control
in naming that a father possesses when legally acknowledging paternity. The court further stated that
the father's absolute right undermined family integrity and served no legitimate state interest in
administrative convenience. !d. at 782-83.
239. See, e.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (classifications based on sex are
inherently suspect and therefore must be subjected to close judicial scrutiny).
240. See, e.g., Kruzel v. Podell, 67 Wis. 2d at _ _ , 226 N .W.2d at 463 ("[t]he common law.
has never ossified to the point of holding that a wife is required to take her husband's name").
241. See supra notes I 09-14 and accompanying text.
242. Legislative adoption would be preferable to judicial acceptance ef the custodial parent
presumption because noncustodial parents would have explicit notice at the divorce proceeding that
abolition of the paternal preference in naming and of the tender years doctrine allows acceptance of
the logical proposition that naming is an incident of custody. See supra text accompanying notes I 7183.
A custodial parent may stipulate in the divorce decree that the child's name will not be changed.
Yet such an agreement treats the naming right as a right distinct from the incidents of custody and
fails to account for circumstances that would prompt the custodial parent to change a child's name in
accordance with the belief that a change is then in the child's best interests. See supra text
accompanying notes 68-72. The agreement would also infringe on the right to family autonomy. See
supra text accompanying notes 186-201.

822

NoRTH DAKOTA LAw REVIEW

employing the custodial parent presumption. This concept creates
a rebuttable presumption: the custodial parent, who presumptively
acts in the child's best interest, has the right to select or change a
child's name, unless the noncustodial parent can show new facts or
changed circumstances that would bar such a change. The
presumption protects the custodial parent's naming decision
because, like other important decisions that a custodial parent
makes, the choice of a name is a significant decision with legal
significance.
The history of name change litigation reveals not only the
significance of a name but also suggests that judicial acceptance of
the custodial parent presumption builds from this historical
foundation. For a court to employ the custodial parent presumption
in resolving a naming dispute, it would engage in a two-step
process: the determination of who is the custodial parent and of
what constitutes new facts or changed circumstances. Because these
steps require factual inquiry, a court would have discretion in
interpreting the specific circumstances of each case. The custodial
parent presumption, affording a court the opportunity to consider
the unique factors of the family naming dispute, provides a court
with an approach that seeks to protect a child's best interest.

KATHRYN

R.

URBONYA

